On my translators' discussion list, PF replied to me:
You use the word red herring a little too liberally. If the protection
of human and individual rights and preventing the abuse of power by a
ruling party/bureaucracy are not to be the _first_ priorities in a
socialist revolution, you can revolute without me.
There's a place for people who have priorities besides state power in revolutions. Obviously. And obviously everybody chooses how to get involved - it can be purely political - you can be for the new regime or against it, or socio-economic too - for the new state or against it. And you can choose to keep your head down and your fingers crossed, as Stalin did during October when he was skulking in the editorial offices of Pravda preaching conciliation with the Provisional Government. And you can scoot off to your dacha and sit it out.
Revolutions happen, almost regardless of our priorities and wishes. You can't prioritize or wish a revolution into being. And you can't wish away the violence involved. As a worker you'd be mad to be a pacifist while the counter-revolutionary white guards are shooting at you.
The organization, vitality, democratic health and programmatic clarity of the forces involved are what determines the fate of issues like human rights during a period of revolutionary upheaval. In general, revolutionary armies have codes of conduct requiring humane treatment of civilians and enemy combatants - often on pain of death for violations - while counter-revolutionary armies behave despicably. Pissing on enemy corpses, mocking enemy cultural values, raping and stealing, etc. Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuo Min Tang reactionaries are perfect examples of this.
When it comes to post-conflict social life the same goes. If there is a low level of organizational vitality, democracy and programmatic clarity in the leading political forces, you're in for trouble. Sometimes regardless of your priorities and wishes. It is ridiculous and unhistorical to foist the blame for the degeneration of the Bolshevik Party in power on Lenin and Trotsky. Neither creating an intelligence service nor putting down a serious mutiny are exceptionable matters in a situation of extreme social tension, let alone a war. When you have a series of deliberate constitutional changes aimed at reducing broad popular participation and increasing the power of a bureaucracy and executive working in cahoots, then you have an exceptional threat to popular rights and the healthy exercise of power. In the final year of Lenin's life it is very clear from his writings that he regarded the bureaucratic cancer creeping over the government and party-political and social life as a very high priority. In his "testament" he warns explicitly of Stalin's flaws.
Creating and maintaining a healthy political regime in a political party isn't easy. It doesn't get any easier if people with healthy instincts turn their backs on politics because it's hot in the kitchen and pots go flying. Parties (despite what Tomás claims) are where politics are forged. The heat and steel come from the masses and their interests, but the weapons (programme and strategic plan) and leaders come from the parties.
Like I said, revolutions happen. We can choose to revolute along with them, or against them, or stand and watch. They are mass events. Mass mobilizations. You don't have to go around knocking on doors to get people out to make a revolution. That's the whole character of them - they are social eruptions. If I have a programme and leadership to offer for a revolution, then the masses in their assemblies will decide whether to take them or not. As happened throughout 1917 in Russia during the revolutionary upheaval between February and November, when the Soviets were massively democratic assemblies of workers, peasants and others who thrashed over a huge number of political and organizational matters. The victory of the Bolshevik programme and party was in no sense a manoeuvre or a coup. The Soviets were the great centres of mass decision-making where the weapons and leaders of the revolution were selected in open competition. The Mensheviks screwed up and were rejected (as was Stalin's conciliatory line towards them).
Plenty of Mensheviks ran away from the revolution when they lost favour. But it was no great hardship for many of their leaders, they just exchanged an editorial office in Moscow for one in New York and got lionized by the imperialists (Kerensky, for instance).
There is ample prima facie proof of the popularity of the Bolshevik leadership of the revolution with the Russian people in the mere fact that over a hundred million Russians followed them in war and faced extreme hardship for three years to chase out and keep out Russian (Ukrainian etc) reactionaries and imperialist invaders. There were never enough Bolshevik commissars to whip the peasants into doing this by brute force - the Tsarist knout was a thing of the past. The peasants and peasant-workers in the army, for Christ sake, had thrown down their weapons and deserted from the Tsar's army only the previous year! And yet they took up arms again and followed Trotsky's strategic guidance and fought successfully!
Please, Paul, try and get some perspective into this period of Russian history. If the not-even-socialist half-measures of Allende and the popular upsurge of his day in power are inspiring, before Kissinger and Pinochet smashed them, then surely the real social and economic changes that took place between 1917 and 1920 in Russia are even more inspiring, especially since the many Kissingers and Pinochets of the time were soundly thrashed and sent home whimpering with their tails between their legs.
